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Abstract 
The completion of EMU, and banking union as its critical component, requires that certain taboos in the 
policy debate are brought out in the open. First, the Commission must stop pretending that Italian public 
debt is sustainable under current policies and shift from politically motivated forbearance to serious 
implementation of the SGP and notably its debt rule. Second, it is necessary to acknowledge that crisis 
management by the ESM is crippled as long as its financial assistance can only be granted after the 
country in need is close to losing market access and, in addition, this threatens the financial stability of 
the entire euro area. The already-existing alternative to assist a country that is not respecting the SGP 
is to utilise the enhanced conditional credit line (ECCL) introduced by the ESM reform, approved by the 
European Council and awaiting national ratifications, in order to agree on a full-fledged adjustment pro-
gramme before any euro area member (Italy) comes to the brink again – without any preventive condi-
tions on the sustainability of public debt. And, third, the completion of the banking union requires a 
reduction of banks’ home sovereign portfolios, that can be incentivised by the introduction of mild con-
centration charges. However, the system will not work without simultaneously offering the banks and 
financial investors in general a true European safe asset, fully guaranteed by its member states. Our 
proposal is that such a safe asset could be offered by the ESM, which would purchase in exchange the 
sovereigns held by the ESCB as a result of the quantitative easing asset purchase programme. The risk 
of losses on these sovereigns would continue to lie with the national central banks, thus avoiding the 
transfer of new risks to the ESM. 
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1. Introduction 
Negotiations on the governance of EMU have come to a standstill on a wide front encompass-
ing the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Treaty and 
banking union. It is high time to recognise that this gridlock cannot be resolved within the ne-
gotiating framework developed by the Eurogroup, which is flawed in its two basic premises: 
that financial stability of the euro area can be achieved without any arrangements for sovereign 
risk sharing; and that crisis management in the euro area requires the establishment of a mech-
anism of preventive sovereign debt restructuring. Recent events add a new urgency to the mat-
ter, as once again the euro area is confronted with rising financial fragmentation owing to a 
lack of coordination in the economic and financial response to the health crisis. 
It is claimed that both premises stem directly from the no-bailout principle of the EU Treaty 
(Article 125 TFEU). However, the Greek debt crisis showed that the survival of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) may well make a bailout inevitable following systematic and pro-
longed violation of common fiscal rules. More broadly, the 2008-09 financial crisis and the sub-
sequent euro area debt crisis showed that a common monetary policy in diverse countries may 
lead to the accumulation of unsustainable financial imbalances in the private sector which, fol-
lowing a financial shock, may then endanger the sustainability of sovereign finances (Micossi, 
2015; Sandbu, 2015). The reasonable response by the European Council was to strengthen fis-
cal rules and to launch banking union in order to sever the link between sovereign debt and 
banking crises.  
However, despite important progress on both fronts, the introduction of credible rules pre-
venting unsustainable sovereign indebtedness has not been achieved; banking union remains 
incomplete, without its cross-border deposit insurance pillar supported by a credible fiscal 
backstop; and the main crisis management tool of the euro area, the ESM, has undergone a 
questionable reform entailing a stronger role of the creditor member states in granting finan-
cial assistance and problematic new clauses on preventive debt restructuring. As a result, fi-
nancial fragmentation has not been eliminated and EMU remains exposed to idiosyncratic fi-
nancial shocks, which may well require further violations of the no-bailout principle if the euro 
is to survive, the alternative being to let it unravel.   
This note argues that it is high time to change approach and, rather than building ever further 
layers of opaque rules to accommodate incompatible negotiating red lines, to directly tackle 
the main stumbling blocks impeding a well-functioning EMU, thus reassuring financial investors 
that the euro will not be brought to the brink again. These stumbling blocks are the colossal 
Italian sovereign debt, the threat of sovereign debt restructuring when ESM financial assistance 
is sought, and the excessive sovereign exposure of some national banking systems. With these 
obstacles out of the way, a revised economic policy governance and the completion of banking 
union would no longer be the unattainable goals they unfortunately appear to be at the mo-
ment. Financial fragmentation would have been conquered. 
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2. Italy’s sovereign debt is the main threat to EMU 
Italy’s sovereign debt reached almost 136% of GDP at the end of 2019, after rising by 30 per-
centage points between 2007 and 2014 and then hovering around that level ever since (Chart 
1). This dramatic increase is by and large explained by the fall in GDP engendered by the twin 
financial crises of 2008-09 and 2011-12 – the largest fall in peace-time experienced by Italy 
since the country’s unification in 1861 (Bastasin et al., 2019).  
Chart 1. Italy - Public debt (% of GDP), nominal GDP growth (%) and 10-year long-term interest 
rate (%, monthly data) 
 
 
Furthermore, since 2018, a positive gap has emerged between the average interest rate on 
sovereign debt and the nominal growth rate of GDP. Thus, while the current low level of inter-
est rates mitigates the ‘snowball effect’ stemming from this positive gap, under current trends 
Italy’s public debt is technically unsustainable.  
On this, Bastasin et al. (2019) have argued that the long term sustainability of Italy’s public debt 
is fundamentally endangered on the one hand by the growing rigidity of public expenditure, 
largely made up by pensions, salaries and interest payments on the debt; and, on the other 
hand, by the resulting implicit promise of future punitive taxation on business and private 
wealth that they see as a main reason for the collapse of private investment. Public investment 
also fell, bearing the brunt of the effect of expenditure reducing policies. The resulting stagna-
tion of productivity has been aggravated by the halt, and even reversal, of economic reforms 
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since 2016 (European Commission, 2019a and 2020) and by the distribution of generous public 
transfers by the last three governments (altogether some 2 percentage points of GDP) that 
destroy the incentive to work and endanger the sustainability of the pension system. The single 
currency brings important benefits in terms of lower interest rates and market integration, but 
it rules out any relief of the debt burden through higher inflation.  
Chart 1 calls the attention to another important feature of Italy’s predicament: clearly, the high 
variability of the interest rate on sovereign debt has not been driven by the evolution of the 
debt ratio but rather by external events and domestic political factors. Thus, the rise in interest 
rates in 2011-12 reflected contagion effects of the Greek debt crisis, which were only brought 
under control after the adoption of draconian public deficit reduction measures by the Monti 
government (at the end of 2011) and decisions by the European Council and the ECB (in the 
course of 2012) that dispelled investors’ fears on the possible breakdown of EMU. Later on, 
large upwards jumps in interest rates were generated by the advent in the summer of 2018 of 
the anti-European ‘yellow-green’ government and the subsequent confrontation with the Eu-
ropean Commission regarding respect of European budgetary rules. They were reversed when 
a new government, installed in the summer of 2019, adopted a budget law still not in line with 
European rules but looked on kindly by the European Commission largely on account of political 
considerations. 
Thus, Italy’s financial stability stands on a fragile platform of Commission forbearance, which 
so far has managed to sustain investors’ confidence but is meeting growing opposition among 
euro area partners. And indeed, the adequacy of Commission policies on Italy under the SGP is 
open to question. What has happened is well summarised in Chart 2 that depicts budgetary 
goals under the SGP, the higher deficits tolerated under the various flexibility clauses (as under 
the 2015 Commission Communication), and actual outcomes (indicated by a bold X in the 
chart). As may be seen, since 2016 Italy has systematically failed to respect the deficit and the 
MTO requirements despite substantial flexibility allowances (cumulatively, €36 billion or over 
2% of 2019 GDP); a further overrun in the order of 0.7% of GDP is already factored in for 2020, 
now likely to be aggravated by the coronavirus health crisis.   
In its August 2019 Report, the European Fiscal Board noted that, following the approval of the 
Two-Pack reforms,1 policy surveillance has concentrated on annual budgetary balances, shift-
ing the nature of fiscal surveillance from a multilateral to a bilateral dimension and de facto 
giving the Commission solo responsibility for the opinions on draft budgetary plans submitted 
by the member states in October. In the case of Italy, which experienced dismal growth and 
increasing political turmoil over the period, this opened the way to a growing laxity in policy 
assessments by the Commission, motivated by the desire to appease a public opinion turning 
increasingly anti-European. The systematic divergence of national policies from the country-
 
1 Since the Two-Pack reform in 2013, under Regulation 473/2013 euro area members are required every autumn 
to submit their draft budgetary plans (DBP) for the ensuing year to the Commission and the Eurogroup. The Com-
mission may issue a negative opinion when it identifies “particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary 
policy obligations laid down in the SGP” in the DBP; in this case the country has to submit a revised DBP.        
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specific recommendations was by and large condoned by ever broader use of political discre-
tion. With the benefit of hindsight, this was especially unfortunate in view of Italy’s dismal 
growth performance, which is by no means of a cyclical nature but rather reflects deep struc-
tural factors depressing potential growth (cf. European Commission, 2020; IMF 2019; Ichino et 
al., 2019).  
Chart 2. Italy, required and delivered changes of the structural balance (%) 
 
Note: Data for 2019-20 prior to corona-virus emergency. 
One implication of the emphasis on annual outcomes in surveillance by the Commission is that 
past overruns are not corrected; this is reflected in the cumulative deviation from the debt rule 
of the high-debt countries within the euro area. Chart 3 shows that in this regard Italy has be-
come the extreme outlier in the euro area (together with Greece, which however is a special 
case that we will discuss in the next section), with reference both to the value of its debt-to-
GDP ratio and to the fact that this ratio shows no tendency to decline. Both the Commission 
opinion on Italy’s draft budgetary plan for 2020 and its earlier report on the respect of the debt 
rule (European Commission, 2019a and 2019b) stress in their conclusions that Italy is non-com-
pliant with the medium-term objective (MTO) and the country-specific recommendations. The 
recent Italy Country Report (European Commission, 2020) concludes that Italy’s economic im-
balances are not expected to unwind in the near term while its debt-to-GDP ratio will continue 
to worsen in 2020 and 2021. Sooner or later investors are going to take notice.   
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Thus, also in view of the sheer size of its public debt, Italy currently stands as the single most 
serious threat to the financial stability of the euro area. If its high debt is not addressed with 
credible corrective measures, no progress can be expected in the negotiations on the comple-
tion of EMU and banking union. 
One-shot debt reduction operations are not on the cards: following the mass privatisations of 
the 1990s, the sale of remaining public assets would do little to diminish the mountain of sov-
ereign debt, and a fragmented political system is unlikely to bite the bullet and levy a large 
wealth tax on the substantial real and financial assets held by its citizens, which (according to 
Banca d’Italia’s annual survey of household wealth) are equivalent to some eight times dispos-
able income. The option of debt restructuring is also inconceivable on account of the massive 
disruption that it would entail for the economy, society and possibly even the survival of de-
mocracy in a country with weak political institutions and rampant populist parties (we will re-
turn to the issue of debt restructuring in the next section).  
Chart 3. Debt ratio by groups of member states (% of GDP) 
 
 
There is really no alternative, therefore, to the tough medicine of building a substantial primary 
surplus in the public sector – raising it from the present level of just above 1% to at least 3.5%, 
and more if the current low interest rates were to rise – and undertaking unpopular economic 
reforms. A credible commitment to debt reduction would bring the immediate benefits of 
lower interest rates, and private investment would likely come back, thus compensating the 
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initial negative impact on demand of reduced net government deficits. The positive confidence 
effect on economic activity would be compounded by economic reform policies promising to 
lift potential growth. 
In order to reap its full benefits, Italy’s commitment to debt reduction and economic reform 
should be enshrined in a multi-year programme, approved by parliament and subsequently in-
corporated into an agreement with the European institutions, which would be capable of an-
choring investors’ expectations to a new stable path of domestic policies. As has been sug-
gested by Marcello Messori (2019), a useful tool to this end may be offered by the new En-
hanced Conditional Credit Line (ECCL) provided for in the reformed ESM Treaty (yet to be rati-
fied by national Parliaments). We will return to this aspect in the next section.  
3. Crisis management and debt restructuring 
Crisis management in the euro area is built on various pillars that include the ECB monetary 
policy and market interventions, the reinforced SGP (after the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack re-
forms) and the linked surveillance procedure over member states’ economic policies, and the 
ESM. The latter is the cornerstone: it provides financial assistance to member states that are at 
risk of losing market access, subject to strict conditionality, when this is indispensable for safe-
guarding the financial stability of the euro area (Article 3 of its founding Treaty). Moreover, the 
possibility of activating the ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) for the debt securities 
of a member state under attack is also predicated on the conclusion of a financing agreement 
or precautionary credit line with the ESM entailing appropriate policy conditionality. 
These mechanisms do not offer a solid dam against speculative attacks: they may only be acti-
vated when a country under attack is coming to the brink of precipice, when this attack poses 
a threat to the stability of the entire euro area, and, in any case, after concluding an accord 
with the ESM entailing strict conditionality – which, of course, would require time and hard 
decisions to be negotiated. The very announcement that a country is seeking ESM assistance 
could trigger turmoil in financial markets. The September 2012 market stabilising operation by 
the ECB would likely not be repeatable without actual sovereign debt purchases under the OMT 
– which would also require agreement on an ESM financial assistance programme.  
Against this background, the ESM Treaty reform – already approved by the Council but not yet 
sent for ratification before national parliaments owing to last minute Italian reservations – has 
given new powers to the ESM in assessing the conditions for granting financial assistance. First, 
the ESM, and thus indirectly the euro area member states who control its governing bodies, 
will now have own powers to “follow and assess the macroeconomic and financial situation of 
its Members including the sustainability of their public debt” (new Article 3). Up until now, the 
Commission was solely responsible for this assessment.  
Moreover, in Article 13.1 it is now established that the assessment as to whether public debt is 
sustainable “and whether stability support can be repaid” will be undertaken jointly by: (i) the 
managing director of the ESM; (b) and the European Commission in liaison with the ECB. Based 
on these assessments, the final proposal to the Board of Governors of the ESM on whether to 
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grant financial assistance, and under what conditions, will be made by the managing director 
of the ESM. This assessment “shall be conducted in a transparent and predictable manner while 
allowing for sufficient margins of judgement”. In this context, the expression “transparent and 
predictable” evokes a notion of preventive debt restructuring, before granting financial assis-
tance, based on objective quantitative indicators – as demanded by some member states; while 
the reference to “sufficient margins of judgement” indicates that, when financial assistance is 
sought, debt restructuring will not be the automatic result of quantitative indicators. Further 
ambiguity is added by Recital 12A, which specifies that in case of disagreement, the Commis-
sion will make the overall assessment on debt sustainability while the ESM will assess the ability 
of the member state concerned to repay the ESM. It is also envisaged (Recital 12) that “upon 
request by an ESM member and where appropriate, the ESM may facilitate the dialogue be-
tween the ESM member and its private investors on a voluntary, informal, nonbinding, tempo-
rary, and confidential basis”.2     
Thus, we end up with one thing and its opposite: an ambiguous result of convoluted bureau-
cratic compromises that is bound to create great uncertainty on the actual application of ESM 
conditionality in a specific programme of financial assistance.  
The new emphasis on preventive debt restructuring derives from a famous ‘non-paper’ by 
Wolfgang Schäuble (2017), which was his legacy statement on the occasion of his departure 
from the Eurogroup; it was taken up by seven French and seven German economists in their 
influential CEPR Policy Insight paper (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018), and again resurfaced in the 
Franco-German Meseberg Declaration on Europe of June 2018. The argument runs as follows: 
there is a time inconsistency in the assessment of debt sustainability, because debt restructur-
ing is overly expensive and hence there is tendency to delay the judgement of unsustainability 
and to keep on lending to a country that will not be able to repay its debts. This creates moral 
hazard and weakens market discipline. 
The solution advocated by the French and German economists – within the context of a com-
prehensive proposal covering the financial system, new fiscal rules, a reformed ESM and the 
introduction of a EU safe asset – was predicated on the premise that there was a need to re-
store the credibility of the no-bailout rule (Article 125 TFEU), which was to be achieved by ex-
cluding insolvent countries from ESM financial assistance unless they first restructured their 
sovereign debt. In their view, this would strengthen the incentives for responsible fiscal policies 
and would prevent economically destructive ‘gambles for redemption’ that ultimately always 
prove fruitless.  
Accordingly, they proposed legal arrangements to facilitate debt restructuring through the in-
troduction of ‘single limb’ (single vote) aggregation of creditors in the restructuring negotia-
tions to overcome the ‘hold-out’ problem – a proposal that is now incorporated in the ESM 
 
2 In the old treaty, the existence of the conditions for granting ESM assistance was to be assessed by the European 
Commission. The Commission would also determine whether the public debt of the country seeking assistance is 
sustainable, “whenever appropriate and possible” in collaboration with the IMF. No role was envisaged here for 
the member states.  
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reform (Recital 11). More importantly, they proposed that the ESM develop its own debt sus-
tainability analysis, using transparent and consistent criteria across countries “that would need 
to be assessed based on a data-driven method that can be reproduced and checked by the 
public”. One option they mention is to envisage an automatic maturity extension of privately 
held debts for the duration of an ESM programme; another possibility is to have countries un-
der a programme issue debt subject to automatic restructuring whenever the country con-
cerned violated the expenditure limits agreed under the programme. 
Two main objections have been raised to this approach. The first is at the same time analytical 
and empirical: as argued by Guido Tabellini (2017), as there is no evidence that countries’ debt 
policies are motivated by moral hazard, resorting to debt restructuring to strengthen market 
discipline over fiscal policies appears misguided.  
The second objection is even more compelling. Debt sustainability is not a stable condition that 
can be reliably measured with objective quantitative indicators, but rather evolves unpredicta-
bly with market sentiment (Messori and Micossi, 2018; Micossi, 2017). In a multiple equilibrium 
world, an unpredicted shock to confidence may tilt the balance from a stable to an unstable 
debt path; the announcement that a debt sustainability analysis may qualify the stable config-
uration of the economy as (potentially) unsustainable may well become the shock shifting the 
economy to the unstable path.3 
The behaviour of interest rate spreads between high-debt countries’ sovereigns in the euro 
area and the German bund provides a clear illustration of the problem (Chart 4). Already in 
2010 the news of a possible insolvency cum Grexit pushed the Greek interest rate close to 30%; 
it came down to below 20% on the announcement of an agreement with private creditors (con-
cluded in March 2012), but shot up again following the difficult negotiations on a new rescue 
package.  
Pretty soon investors started to look for other targets and rapidly pushed Ireland and then Por-
tugal against the wall, forcing them to seek financial assistance from the EFSF (the EU facility 
preceding the ESM). In both cases, the governments decided to fully guarantee the banks’ lia-
bilities, in order to avoid worse damage to the economy, leading to a large increase in govern-
ment debt. Contagion was heightened by the Merkel-Sarkozy announcement in Deauville that 
private creditors would have to participate in debt restructuring: Mody (2014) estimated that 
 
3 These arguments are also reflected in IMF lending policies, notably its exceptional access lending. In its 2002 
framework, this policy allowed exceptionally large financing when four criteria were met, among which one was 
that there is a high probability that the country’s debt is sustainable. When this criterion was not met, debt re-
structuring would have to precede IMF lending. The Greek crisis convinced the IMF to adapt the policy with explicit 
allowance for the possibility that debt might be sustainable but not with high probability. This ‘systemic exception’ 
was introduced precisely out of serious concerns that upfront debt restructuring could lead to serious contagion 
effects in Europe and beyond. The systemic exception was later removed, but the policy still allows the IMF to 
lend when the debt is not sustainable with high probability as long as the member also receives financing from 
other sources, private and public. As to debt restructuring, the policy would also include the softer option of ‘debt 
reprofiling’, that is a (short) extension of maturities during the programme, with normally no reduction in principal 
or coupon.        
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this announcement alone cost the Greek government an increase of 150 basis points in the 
spread with the Bund. 
Chart 4. 10-years long-term interest rate (%, monthly data 2009-2015) 
 
Source: ECB. 
 
The subsequent decision in 2011 to restructure Greek private exposure detonated the start of 
contagion involving Spain, Italy and even France. In November, a rampant speculative attack 
obliged Italy to dismiss the Berlusconi government and call in former European Commissioner 
Mario Monti to enact a shock budgetary stabilisation package, pushing the economy into a 
deep recession. In July 2012, Spain negotiated a €100 billion financial assistance program from 
the EFSF for the recapitalisation of financial institutions, agreeing on a memorandum of under-
standing entailing mild macro-economic conditionality.  Eventually, it took the ECB’s new OMT 
programme, which was launched in September 2012 and promised unlimited purchases of sov-
ereigns under speculative attack, to halt the run of investors on indebted countries in the euro 
area.  
A careful empirical analysis of the factors driving the pricing of interest rate spreads for Greece 
by Gibson et al. (2014) concluded the following: prior to 2008-09, financial markets paid little 
attention to deteriorating economic fundamentals, and accordingly utterly failed to incorpo-
rate credit risk in the price of Greek sovereigns. Subsequently, following the revelation of the 
true state of government accounts (in 2010), sovereign downgrades by rating agencies and 
political uncertainty pushed up Greek sovereign spreads well above the levels justified by eco-
nomic fundamentals. The study also found evidence of a separate effect of credit downgrades 
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generating a perverse loop of rising spreads, falling economic activity, worsening debt sustain-
ability, and again rating downgrades. We already observed in Chart 1 that the behaviour of 
Italy’s spread seems unrelated to the government debt ratio but moves wildly in response to 
political shocks. 
This evidence confirms what was already well known, that financial markets are not capable of 
ensuring fiscal or economic discipline but react rather erratically to short-term shocks. More 
important, debt sustainability may be affected by market sentiment in an unpredictable man-
ner, making an objective and ‘data driven’ measure of debt sustainability quite difficult to 
achieve.        
As to the effectiveness of debt restructuring in reducing the debt burden and restoring debt 
sustainability, Chart 5 shows that massive private debt restructuring in Greece in March 2012 
led to an increase in overall government exposure, owing to the need to fill the gap created  by 
vanishing private finance.  
Chart 5. Greek government debt (%, of GDP) 
 
 
As Greece had already lost market access, an increasing role in providing liquidity to the Greek 
financial system was then taken up by the ECB, through its emergency liquidity assistance – 
which thus evolved from an emergency credit line for individual banks in difficulty to an emer-
gency macro-financing channel (Micossi, 2015; European Commission, 2017b). The result is 
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that Greek sovereign debt is now even less sustainable than it had been prior to private debt 
restructuring; the fact the most of it is owed to public institutions has pushed all talk of further 
debt restructuring into an indefinite future. Jeromin Zettelmeyer has argued that the bad out-
come of the 2012 Greek debt restructuring is due to the delay in decisions (PIIE, 2020), but his 
interpretation strains credibility. From what we have seen, the sure effect of preventive debt 
restructuring is that of cutting the country out of all external financing and raising the cost of 
external finance to unsustainable heights, thus compelling the government to become the re-
sidual provider of finance to the economy. The only way to restore sovereign debt sustainability 
is debt relief (and the ESM is best placed to provide it with sufficiently long-term financing at 
concessionary terms).  
This discussion points to an inevitable conclusion. While debt restructuring cannot be ruled out 
eventually as a component of actions to restore market access of a country unable to service 
its public debt, the notion that preventive debt restructuring when granting ESM financial as-
sistance should simply be removed from the table is utterly destabilising. Debt sustainability, 
on the other hand can only be taken fully into account in adjustment programmes, as required 
by the ESM Treaty, to the extent that it is approached with tools that do not elicit an investor 
run – such as privatisations, domestic wealth taxes, or with a primary surplus maintained for a 
sufficiently long time to restore investors’ confidence in the country, together with incisive re-
forms to strengthen potential output.  
Building an effective crisis management system requires a further step – as has been described 
– to correct for the fact that financial assistance from the ESM only becomes accessible in con-
ditions of extreme turbulence, i.e. when the concerned country is close to losing market access 
and the financial stability of the euro area is under threat. This set-up reflects the reluctance of 
potential creditors to intervene, but may encourage speculative attacks following the news that 
a country may be approaching the ESM for assistance. A confidence crisis that hits a country in 
the euro area is likely to spread to other member countries. As noted by Tabellini (2018), the 
resilience of the euro area is not much higher than that of its weakest member; therefore, 
reforms that increase the vulnerability of the weakest countries may well prove counterpro-
ductive for the financial stability of the entire euro area (Messori and Micossi, 2018).  
Fortunately, a way out of this conundrum is provided in the reformed ESM Treaty by the ECCL, 
its new precautionary credit line, which is accessible by a country that is not compliant with 
SGP rules but has a strong adjustment programme guaranteeing debt sustainability. The pre-
cautionary nature of this credit line excludes the detrimental announcement effect of the 
standard request of financial assistance; any actual resort to ESM financing could very well be 
avoided, as the country’s market access would not be imperilled. The possibility to address 
mounting domestic financial imbalances without the risk of financial turmoil should offer suffi-
cient inducement for member states to turn to this facility in good time – as shown by the 
successful financing operation negotiated by Spain in 2012 to restore the capital and viability 
of its banking system. Provided, of course, that national politicians are lucid enough to recog-
nise the advantage of corrective policy action before the country arrives at the brink.  
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4. Tackling banks’ sovereign exposures 
The third issue blocking progress in the completion of banking and monetary union is banks 
sovereign exposure, which threatens the stability of EMU due to the potential resurgence of 
the ‘doom loop’ between the sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis observed in 2010-12. 
The other main legacy risk of the twin financial crises in the euro area in 2008-09 and 2010-12 
was the excessive accumulation of non-performing loans (NPL), but by and large this has been 
reduced to manageable proportions (especially in the banks under direct ECB supervision) 
thanks to strong supervisory policies as well substantial capital strengthening by the banking 
system over the past decade (EBA, 2019).  
On the other hand, the sovereign exposure of some banking systems versus their sovereign 
remains exceedingly high, notably in Italy, Portugal and Spain (Chart 6). Relative to CET1 capital, 
this exposure was estimated to amount on average to about 140% (120% if the exposures are 
weighted with the banks’ share in CET1 capital). Banks in Belgium, Italy, and Germany have 
exposure ratios over CET1 capital at or above 200%. A notable feature in this exposure that is 
directly relevant for the sovereign-bank nexus is its strong home bias: some three-quarters are 
represented by debt of their national sovereign (Véron, 2017).4 
Chart 6. Sovereign debts held by domestic banks (% of total assets, 1999-2019) 
 
 
4 These data date back some years but probably still offer a reliable representation of the current situation.     
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The sovereign-bank nexus is a straightforward matter. Distress in sovereign markets spills over 
into the banking system directly through their holdings of sovereign paper and indirectly 
through the state of the economy; conversely, severe distress in the banking system may ulti-
mately require government interventions that worsen debt sustainability (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2017; Schnabel and Véron, 2018). The nexus could be substantially weak-
ened, if not eliminated, by full cross-border deposit insurance; however, this would require that 
member states collectively share the risk of sovereign distress in one country leading to a se-
vere banking crisis, thus de facto mutualising sovereign debt sustainability risks.  
The immediate consequence is that the European scheme for cross-border deposit insurance 
(EDIS) proposed by the European Commission does not fly and EMU remains incomplete and 
gravely exposed to idiosyncratic financial shocks. Negotiations on this have endlessly turned 
around attempts at building cross-border deposit insurance without risk sharing – which core 
countries assimilate to a promise of bail out – by limiting joint support to a national banking 
system under stress to temporary credit lines to be repaid by the same banks when the crisis 
subsides. And indeed, in a different context, a credit line is the only last-resort backup by the 
ESM to the Single Resolution Fund that could be agreed upon in the Eurogroup for the reformed 
ESM Treaty.  
However, deposit insurance without risk sharing will not eliminate financial fragmentation – at 
least not until all financial stability risks have been eliminated in high-debt members in the euro 
area. With financial fragmentation, the risks of similar financial instruments and financial inter-
mediaries in different euro area members are priced differently by market investors, limiting 
cross-border interbank and capital flows, which in turn acts as a major limitation on capital 
markets union. The threat of debt restructuring and, ultimately, of exit from the euro, is but 
another factor raising financial fragmentation, as investors seek the higher returns on low-
grade sovereign debt but stand ready to flee at the slightest political shock.   
Be that as it may, there is little doubt that banks’ sovereign exposure in high-debt members of 
the euro area remains a main stumbling block to an agreement on EDIS. In recent years the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision discussed various possible changes to the regulatory 
treatment of sovereigns in banks’ balance sheets – which at present are normally exempted 
both from risk-weighted capital requirements and from the large exposure limits.  
The main options under consideration were the introduction of risk weights for most sovereign 
exposures in the banking and trading books and/or the introduction of concentration charges 
to discourage sovereign concentration risk. Other ideas that have been discussed include sov-
ereign risk monitoring and stress-testing under Pillar 2 guidance, and enhanced disclosure of 
sovereign risk exposure under the Pillar 3 framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2017). Proposals entailing capital penalties linked to sovereign risk rating were met by strong 
objections, mainly for two reasons: because the calculation of the risk weights for sovereigns is 
fraught with unsurmountable difficulties due the fickleness of market sentiment on sovereign 
debts; and because the application of risk weights linked to sovereign debt ratings would inev-
itably prove pro-cyclical, raising capital charges on banks and pushing them to unload their 
sovereigns precisely when these come under pressure in the market. The possible creation of 
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a competitive disadvantage for EU banks internationally was also seen as an important draw-
back (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2017; Véron, 2017). 
Concentration charges, on the other hand, do not suffer from these drawbacks since they 
would be independent of debt ratings; for this reason, they have found widespread support 
among academia and policy analysts.  At present, large exposures are limited to 25% of CET1 
capital but the limit does not apply to sovereign exposures. The exemption would be removed 
for exposure ratios, relative to CET1 capital, higher than a given threshold (that could be well 
higher than 25%); after passing the threshold, the bank would be confronted with (mildly) rising 
capital charges linked to rising volumes in excess of the threshold. The identification of the 
threshold and the calibration of the concentration charges above that threshold would need to 
take account of the multifaceted role that sovereigns play in the balance sheet and operations 
of the banks. If appropriately calibrated and flexibly implemented, concentration charges may 
help reduce banking risks without weakening financial stability – against the background of 
strong debt reduction policies in high-debt euro area countries, as we have previously de-
scribed. 
Recent empirical research by Lamas and Mencia (2019) on Spanish banks’ behaviour in periods 
of sovereign stress confirmed that the increase in sovereign portfolios was not motivated by 
moral hazard or opportunistic risk-shifting strategies, but rather by broad macro-economic fac-
tors, notably including financial fragmentation. They associate this behaviour to the pursuit of 
a hedge against the risk of an EMU break-up and the redenomination of the banks’ liabilities in 
the national currency (cf. also Tabellini 2018). This calls once again the attention to the fact, 
not sufficiently appreciated in the policy debate, that financial fragmentation hampers the con-
tribution of private cross-border credit and capital flows to risk sharing, ultimately raising the 
probability that a severe financial shock may require a bailout by euro area partners with official 
resources (Micossi, 2017).  
The introduction of regulatory disincentives for banks’ sovereign holdings will not work unless 
banks and market investors are provided with adequately large quantities of a new European 
risk-free or ‘safe’ asset to accommodate the diversification of sovereign portfolios (Visco, 2019; 
ESRB, 2018; Bénassy-Quéré, 2018). Banks need a risk-free asset, available in large quantities, 
to underpin their liquidity management operations, their market making activities, the pricing 
of securities, and their investment and wealth management policies (Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, 2017). They are not likely to abandon their home bias for a financial instrument 
issued by another sovereign – even by, say, Germany – so long as euro-exit and currency re-
denomination remain possible.   
Brunnermeier et al. (2017) made an influential proposal for developing sovereign bond-backed 
securities (SBBS) with varying seniority tranches, with the most senior tranche (European Safe 
Bonds, or ESBies) being as safe as the German bund. Being based on private contracts, their 
SBBS would not entail any risk sharing. A High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets, established by 
the ESRB, was set up to assess the feasibility and impact on financial stability of creating a mar-
ket for SBBS. They concluded (ESRB, 2018) that the development of a demand-led market for 
SBBS might be feasible ‘under certain conditions’, but could not agree either on its desirability 
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(for the feared impact on sovereign debt markets) or its viability without regulatory support 
(including the introduction of concentration charges to penalise banks’ holdings of national 
sovereigns, the usability of ESBies as collateral in ECB operations, and complex enabling product 
legislation). The Commission followed up in May 2018 with a proposal for a Regulation on SBBS 
(European Commission, 2018), which Parliament and Council failed to approve before the end 
of the past legislature. Further possibilities in the same line of thought are discussed by Leandro 
and Zettelmeyer (2019).5 All these proposals aim to create safety by combining diversification 
of the underlying sovereign risk with seniority; this last feature is most problematic due to its 
likely adverse impact on sovereign markets’ spreads and liquidity.   
More importantly, the very idea of building a safe asset without risk-sharing by euro area mem-
bers seems an artefact founded on a wrong premise: that monetary union can survive indefi-
nitely without some element of fiscal union, i.e., as a minimum, some joint sharing of sovereign 
risks. The reason is well-known, and yet consistently overlooked by many participants in the 
policy debate: the single currency generates a special externality due to the lack of a lender of 
last resort in national sovereign markets, which in turn entails the risk of default and currency 
redenomination (Micossi, 2017). Some sovereign risk sharing in EMU is therefore unavoidable 
to conquer financial fragmentation; it must of course be predicated on sufficient convergence 
of national fiscal policies. 
Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that a European safe asset must be issued by an EU public 
entity – arguably, the ESM – and must enjoy a public guarantee against sovereign default. As 
argued by Bini Smaghi and Marcussen (2018), only such a ‘genuine’ Eurobond would bring suf-
ficient benefits to the euro area – including the credible promise that the euro will never again 
be called into question, which is key to conquer financial fragmentation.  
The simple scheme that we would like to propose is that the ESM would purchase the sover-
eigns held by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as a result of the asset purchase 
programme (APP) undertaken to enact its quantitative easing policies. The sovereigns would 
be purchased according to the proportions established in the APP, thus avoiding any undesira-
ble differential impact on national sovereign markets. More importantly, the sovereigns pur-
chased from the ESCB should continue to enjoy the present guarantee against potential losses 
offered by national central banks, so that no sovereign risk would be transferred to the ESM.   
 
5 The first one is an ‘e-bond’ scheme where a public institution, e.g. the ESM, would lend to euro area members 
up to a limit set as a share of GDP, and then issue (single-tranche) securities backed by a portfolio of these loans. 
The loans would be senior to member states’ sovereign debt issuances. The second proposal envisages that the 
euro area members would issue tranched sovereign bonds (with a limit on senior issuances set by reference to 
GDP and/or the debt stock); regulated private intermediaries would purchase a portfolio of the senior tranches 
and issue a single-tranche security backed by those tranced of national sovereigns. A different strand of proposals 
turns around the notion of a Redemption Fund to amortise outstanding sovereign debts (see Cioffi et al., 2019 for 
a review of the literature and a proposal); its main drawback is that, while it could facilitate the reduction of sov-
ereign debt, its contribution to the creation of a safe European asset would only be temporary, i.e. for the time 
required for member states to reimburse their exposure to the Fund. Finally, Bini Smaghi and Marcussen (2018) 
have developed a ‘purple bond’ proposal as an alternative way to protect the seniority of the existing sovereign 
debt stock by means of a no-restructuring clause to be inserted in the ESM Treaty. 
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As a counterpart, the ESM would offer its own securities; its issues could be organised in suita-
ble maturities reflecting the composition of its underlying sovereign portfolio. Like other out-
standing ESM liabilities, these securities would be guaranteed by its sizeable (callable) capital; 
in addition, they would enjoy the guarantee of its member states already in place for ESM lia-
bilities, in proportions determined by the member states shares in the ESM capital. This double 
guarantee, together with the guarantee maintained by national central banks on their sover-
eign paper, should be more than enough to ensure the Triple A rating for ESM securities with-
out any special seniority privilege; a major drawback of the various proposals for a safe asset 
previously examined would thus be eliminated.  
While of course these purchases by the ESM would develop gradually over time, they would 
eventually make available a total amount of over €2 trillion that would offer plenty of space for 
the diversification of banks’ sovereign portfolios, as well for large investments by international 
investors. An adequate basis would thus be established for the development of a large, deep 
and liquid market for a European safe security, that would become the basis for a truly inte-
grated capital market union and underpin the international role of the euro as a reserve cur-
rency and investment instrument.  
This scheme has several other attractive properties that are worth recalling. First, it would over 
time free the ESCB from the encumbrance of sovereigns in their balance sheets, thus creating 
suitable conditions for unwinding the large increase in their balance sheets after quantitative 
easing policies come to an end. As ESM purchases proceeded, the liquidity created by the asset 
purchase programme would be reabsorbed, but the ECB would receive cash from the ESM. It 
could then decide to purchase other sovereigns, to maintain an unchanged policy stance, or let 
its balance sheet shrink if it deemed that the existing degree of monetary stimulus was unwar-
ranted. The time for such a decision will of course be postponed well after the current corona-
virus crisis ends. 
Second, by bringing to the market a large supply of new high-quality assets, the scheme is likely 
to relieve the downward pressure on interest rates in the bond markets of ‘safe’ (low debt) 
euro area countries, opening the way to interest rate increases even with present ECB policies. 
Moreover, these ESM securities would price counter-cyclically, as they would become the safe 
haven for investors fleeing instability (Bini Smaghi and Marcussen, 2018); and they could be-
come the principal instrument of monetary policy operations, as the ECB could purchase and 
sell it freely without effects on national budgetary policies.  
Interest rate spreads and financial fragmentation would in all likelihood be much reduced. How-
ever, the problem will not disappear without the completion of the banking union. For this, the 
ideas flagged by the European Commission (2017a) offer a well-structured way forward – by 
necessity eventually entailing the mutualisation of banking risks but in an environment in which 
sovereign risks would be tamed.  
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5. Conclusions 
We have argued that the completion of EMU, and banking union as its critical component, re-
quires that certain taboos in the policy debate are brought out in the open and broken. First, 
the Commission must stop pretending that the Italian debt is sustainable with current policies 
and shift from politically motivated forbearance to serious implementation of the SGP and no-
tably its debt rule.  
Second, it must be acknowledged that crisis management by the ESM is crippled as long as its 
financial assistance can only be granted after the country in need comes to the brink, which 
threatens the financial stability of the entire euro area. Moreover, the notion that financial 
assistance will be conditioned on a preventive assessment of the sustainability of the country’s 
public debt heightens the destabilising potential of announcing that a country is seeking finan-
cial assistance from the ESM. The already-existing alternative is to utilise the enhanced condi-
tional credit line (ECCL) introduced by the ESM reform in order to agree a full-fledged adjust-
ment programme, also ensuring debt sustainability.   
And, third, the completion of the banking union requires a reduction of banks’ home sovereign 
portfolios, that can be incentivised through the introduction of mild concentration charges. 
However, the system will not work without simultaneously offering the banks and financial in-
vestors a genuine European safe asset, fully guaranteed by its member states.  
Our proposal is that such a safe asset could be offered by the ESM, which would purchase in 
exchange the sovereigns held by the ESCB as a result of the quantitative easing asset purchase 
programme. The risk of losses on these sovereigns would continue to lie with the national cen-
tral banks, thus avoiding the transfer of risks to the ESM. The ESM liabilities would also be guar-
anteed by its sizeable capital as well as by the guarantee of its member countries, according to 
their capital keys in the ESM, as already happens for ESM issues. 
The safe asset would bring along some important benefits, including reduced capital inflows 
and higher interest rates in safe-haven euro area countries (Germany, The Netherlands, etc.). 
Moreover, it would price counter-cyclically, as it would become the safe haven for investors 
fleeing instability. It could become the principal instrument of monetary policy operations, as 
the ECB could purchase and sell it freely without any effect on national budgetary policies. And 
it would offer the basis for an expanded role of the euro in international capital marketsUn-
locking the gridlock in EMU negotiations is taking on a fresh urgency as the euro area is once 
again coming under stress with rising financial fragmentation, as markets are spooked by lack 
of a common response to the daunting challenge posed by the coronavirus; once again, difficult 
decisions may have to be taken in unsettled financial conditions, due to our collective inability 
to advance in fair weather. 
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